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Heilman: Domicil and Specific Intent

JUDGMENT LIEN CREDITORS' SUITS
VIRGINIA

IN

WEST

THOMAS COLEMAN*

No more striking illustration of the growth of the general
subject of equity jurisprudence can be found than is seen
in the history of the equitable remedies of creditors. These
remedies date far back in English history and were adopted
in this country in Colonial days as a part of the general
system of our remedial jurisprudence, and constitute for us
an invaluable legal inheritance from the mother country.
It is the boast of English speaking peoples wherever the
common law and equity systems prevail that no one shall
be left without a remedy, though through the channels of
the common law it early became apparent that under its
rigid rules, full, complete and adequate relief could not in
all cases be given. When this came to be recognized, remedial jurisprudence began its development, and afforded to
creditors full and adequate relief which the common law
denied.
Creditors' bills, broadly considered, are defined as bills
filed in equity by creditors to enforce the payment of debts
out of the property of debtors under circumstances which
impede or render impossible the collection of the debts by
execution; or, what is substantially the same thing, they
are proceedings in equity to compel the discovery and application of equitable assets to the payment of debts, not
reachable by levy and sale under execution.'
They have been classified under our West Virginia practice as those filed to enforce judgment and certain trust or
mortgage liens against the lands of a debtor; those filed
against the estates of decedents for a distribution of the
assets of the estate among the lien and other creditors thereof; and those filed to set aside fraudulent and preferential
conveyances.'
Other text writers and the courts name other
classes as properly falling within the general designation
of creditors' suits.
*A. M., LL. B., Member of the Charleston, West Virginia, Bar.
1 15 C. J. 1380.
2 Hooo's Eq. PBIN., ch. 43, §450.
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Of these several classes, none are of more frequent occurrence in the courts, or more important, considered with reference to the amount and value of the money and property
involved, than are judgment lien creditors' suits brought under Chapter 139, section 7, Code of West Virginia.
Many questions of interest to the profession, some of
them of a perplexing nature, arise in suits of this class. No
little conflict exists in the adjudicated cases. The lower
courts, having no opportunity for contact and mutual understanding, are at variance with one another on some important phases of procedure in this class of litigation.
I.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT.

The West Virginia Statute relating to lien creditors' suits
is of gradual growth, and is the outcome of a long process
of development. At common law it was not permissible to
take the lands of a debtor for his debts, except to satisfy
judgments due the King. The goods and chattels of the
debtor and the annual profits of his lands as they arose were
the only funds available for the payment of his debts. This
continued to be the law until the statute of Westminster 2,
13 Edward I, Chapter 18, (A. D. 1285) which was in substance embodied in the 1 Revised Code of Virginia, Chapter
134, (1819). This important act provided a new form of
execution known as the writ of elegit, by which a moiety of
the lands of the judgment debtor, and all his goods and chattels, saving his oxen and beasts of the plow, might be taken
by the sheriff and delivered to the creditor, and thereby the
creditor became the absolute owner of the personal property,
and was entitled to hold the moiety of the lands as his freehold until he should have levied thereof his debts and damages.' The statute did not expressly make the writ a lien
on the land, but this was done by judicial construction.
The lien was a mere incident of the writ, and was held to
depend for its existence and continuance upon the capacity
to sue out the writ.
The Statute of Westminster, above referred to, creating
the writ of elegit and made a part of the law of Virginia,
continued as such after the revolution and the formation of
s Werdenbaugh v. Reid, 20 W. Va. 588 (1882); Hutcheson v. Grubbs, 80
See also Renick v. Ludington, 14 W. Va. 367 (1878).
Va. 251 (1885).
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the commonwealth. By an act of the General Assembly of
Virginia passed in 1748, it was provided that all persons
who should recover judgments in any court of record might,
at their election, have either of the writs of fieri faias,
elegit, or capias ad satisfaciendurm within one year, for taking the goods, lands, or body of the judgment debtor in the
manner provided by statute.4
The writ of elegit, not made a lien on the real estate of
the judgment debtor by statute, but by judicial construction,
as we have seen, extended to and covered all subsequent
conveyances, even though made to purchasers for valuable
consideration without notice of the judgment, and extended
to all the lands of the debtor within the state. For the
protection of such purchasers the act of 1843 was passed
in Virginia, which provided for the docketing of judgments.
The lien continued the same in all respects as to its nature, extent and mode of enforcement, except for this modification by the act of 1843 in the interest of innocent purchasers, until the general revision of 1849.
Now for the first time a judgmnent was by statute made a
direct and positive lien upon all the real estate of or to
which the judgment debtor was possessed or entitled at or
after the date of the judgment, or if it was rendered in
court, at or after the commencement of the term at which
it was rendered, with the same qualification as to purchasers for value and without notice as was made by the
act of 1843.'
The writ of elegit was preserved by the revision of 1849
(effective July 1, 1850), and was made to conform to the
statutory lien of the judgment created by the same act, and
an additional remedy was given in equity for the enforcement of the judgment lien. Instead of extending to one
moiety of the real estate of the judgment debtor, by the revision of 1849, the writ was extended to the whole of the
real estate of the debtor, leasehold as well as freehold, but
omitting his goods and chattels, which as the writ stood
prior to the revision were subject to levy thereunder.' Thus
the creditor had two remedies to enforce his lien, one by
Werdenbaugh v. Reid, supra, n. 3.
5 VA. CODE, 1849, ch. 186, §§6 and 8; IV. VA. CODE, 1868, ch.
and 7.
0 VA. CODE, 1849, ch. 186, §9; W. V.A. CODE, 1868, ch. 139, §8.
4
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resorting directly to a court of equity, the other by resorting to his elegit. But the two remedies were not equally
efficacious. In case the debtor had fraudulently conveyed
his real estate, or if the estate was an equitable one, or if
the rents and profits were insufficient to keep down the interest on the debt, then the creditor must apply to a court
of equity to enforce the lien of his elegit. The lien of the
judgment being now by statute made express and positive,
and in no way dependent upon the elegit, and the remedy
by resort to the elegit not always being adequate, the remedy
in equity came in time to be preferred, and the remedy by
elegit fell into disuse, and was finally abolished by the
legislatures of both the Virginias.7 No case is presented in
the reported decisions in West Virginia where a judgment
creditor ever enforced or undertook to enforce his claim
against the real estate of his judgment debtor by resort to
his elegit, though the writ was not abolished in West Virginia until 1868, some five years after the formation of the
state. It is not unlikely however, that the writ was resorted to in West Virginia prior to its abolition, and that
rights of the parties in interest may have been litigated in
cases in the lower courts that never reached the Supreme
Court of Appeals.
The abolition of the writ by the Legislature of Virginia
by act of March 26, 1872, was deplored by Mr. Minor as an
unfortunate tendency following the civil war to obstruct the
recovery of debts in order to extend indulgence to unfortunate debtors. He predicted that that policy could not long
endure, and that the writ of elegit would soon be restored."
In several of the states at the present time writs analogous
to the writ of elegit are in force under which real estate is
levied upon and sold to satisfy debts of judgment debtors,
substantially as personal property is levied upon and sold
in West Virginia under the existing law. 'No good reason
is perceived why under proper restrictions real estate in
West Virginia could not in justice to all parties in interest
be levied upon and sold under execution to satisfy a judgment, and the expense, labor and delay incident to a lien
7 W. VA. CODE, 1868, oh. 140, §2; VA. CODE, 1873, ch. 183, §26; Renick
v. Ludington, supra, n. 3; Werdenbaugh r. Reid, supra-, n. 3.
8 2 Mix. INST. (3rd ed.) 309.
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creditor's suit be obviated, just as it is done in other states
where such writs are provided for, with all the advantages
now obtained in the practice in West Virginia by advertisement and sale under deeds of trust, without resort to the
expense and delay of a creditor's suit in chancery.
Since the abolition of the writ in West Virginia in 1868,
a judgment creditor has had to resort alone to a court of
equity for the enforcement of his lien upon the real estate
of the judgment debtor. The statute since that time has
gone through many changes, usually in the form of an expansion of the rights of the creditor, and defining his mode
of procedure. The most important of these several amendments was that made by the Legislature of 1882, which
greatly enlarged the previous statute and defined the
method of procedure, which has stood in substantially the
same form down to the present time.

II.

PARTIES TO LIEN 'CREDITORS' SUITS.

Only judgment lien creditors can institute suits of this
character. Those holding vendors' liens, mechanics' and
materialmen's liens, trust liens, or liens of any other class,
cannot as original plaintiffs claim the benefit of the statute. Specific lienors as well as general lienors, however,
under the statute when not named as formal plaintiffs in
process and bill, may become informal plaintiffs by coming
in and proving their liens and having them allowed.' Under the statute -a judgment lien creditor (or two or more
such creditors if they care to join as plaintiffs) is required
to join as defendants all other persons holding liens upon
the real estate sought to be subjected, whether such liens
arise from judgments or otherwise; and if the number of
such persons exceeds ten the suit may be brought by any
one or more of the judgment lien creditors for the benefit
of himself and such other lien holders, as will come in and
contribute to the expenses of the suit. Whether the suit
be so brought or not, every such lien holder, whether he be
named as a party to the suit or not, and whether he be
served with process therein or not, may present, prove and
9

W. VA. CODE, ch. 139, §7.
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have allowed any claim he may have against the judgment
debtor which is a lien on such real estate, or any part thereof, and from and after the time he presents any such claim
he is deemed a party plaintiff in such suit.1" The publication and posting of the notice provided for by the same section of the statute is expressly made equivalent to the personal service thereof on all persons holding liens on any
such real estate, unless otherwise directed by the court;
and the statute further provides that the lien holder failing
to present and prove his claim to the commissioner shall as
a result forfeit certain rights as therein provided.
The decisions go further than the statute in the particularity with which they designate the necessary parties defendant, declaring them to be: The judgment debtor himself, also the trustees in all deeds of trust on the judgment
debtor's lands sought to be subjected to tie payment of the
judgment liens, and if the deeds of trust are deeds to secure
the payment of a limited number of debts, then the cestiis
que trustent in these deeds, including not only the parties
to whom the debts secured are due, but also all the obligators in these debts, if there be any obligators other than
the grantors or judgment debtors, and if the trusts are of
different character, then all the cestuis que trustent in them,
unless from their indefinite description or some other good
reason they would not all be made defendants in any suit
in equity brought by an adverse claimant against the trustee respecting the trust property, also all the several plaintiffs as well as all the several defendants in all judgments
in the courts of record in the counties in which the lands
sought to be subjected lie, which have been rendered against
the judgment debtor alone, or the judgment debtor and
other defendants jointly, and also all the plaintiffs and all
the defendants in any such judgments, whether rendered by
courts of record or by justices in any part of the state,
which have been docketed on the judgment lien docket of
said county or counties, and any other party, who, according to the general rules of equity in the particular case
has such a direct interest in the subject matter or object
10

Idem.
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of the suit as would render it necessary that he should be
made a defendant to the suit.1
The general rule that cestuis que trustent as well as
trustees in deeds of trust covering the real estate sought to
be subjected, must be made formal parties and served with
process in suits of this character is not of universal application. There are some exceptions, as for instance where
the cestuis que trustent are very numerous, or where the description of them is so general as to make it difficult if not
impossible to ascertain who are all the persons included
therein, or where many of them are unknown. In some of
the excepted cases the trustees are supposed to represent
the interest of the cestuis que triistent.1
A judgment for money rendered by a court of record anywhere in the State of West Virginia is a lien on all of the
real estate of the judgment debtor located in any part of
the state, and this is true, even though the judgment creditor has not caused an abstract thereof to be recorded in
the county or counties where real estate of the judgment
debtor is located. Such judgments must be docketed as required by statute to render the same valid as against purchasers of the real estate of the judgment debtor for value
and without notice of the judgment." Since, therefore,
judgments may be liens upon the real estate of the judgment
debtor, even though there be no record evidence of their
existence in the county or counties where the real state
sought to be subjected is located, it was early seen that it
would be an unreasonable hardship upon the judgment
creditor desiring to sue to enforce his lien to require him to
ascertain the names of such judgment creditors and make
them formal parties to his suit. This would be difficult,
if not impossible, and greatly embarrass him in the enforcement of his lien, and tend to impede rather than to promote
the administration of justice. To obviate this embarrass"' Neely v. Jones, 16 W. Va. 625 (1880) ; Norris, Caldwell & Co. v. Bean,
17 W. Va. 655 (1881); National Bank v. Bates, 20 W. Va. 210, 215-216
(1882); Livesay v. Feamster, 21 V. Va. 83 (1882); Jackson v. Hull, 21
W. Va. 601, 614 (1883); Underwood v. Pack, 23 W. Va. 704, 708 (1884);
Grove v. Judy, 24 W. Va. 294, 297 (1884); Pappenheimer v. Roberts, 24
W. Va. 702 (1884); McNeel's Exors. v. Auldridge, 25 W. Va. 113, 117
(1884).
12 Norris, Caldwell & Co. v. Bean, supra, n. 11.
18 W. VA. CODE,

ch. 139, §§5 and 6.
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ment, the plaintiff is permitted to file a bill on behalf of
himself and all other lien creditors not required to be made
parties defendant. The statute is that when the number of
such lienors exceeds ten, the plaintiff may bring his suit on
behalf of himself and such other lienors as will come in and
contribute to the expenses of the suit, but it is held in a
number of cases that such suit may be brought by the plaintiff on his own behalf and on behalf of all other lienors not
named as parties defendant. He cannot sue for himself and
other lienors whose liens may be ascertained by a search of
the records in the clerk's offices of the counties wherein the
lands lie, which he seeks to subject. They must all be
made formal parties, 4 as must also all lienors whose liens
were created in the counties where the lands sought to be
subjected lie by judgments obtained in courts of record
therein, even though abstracts thereof have not been docketed in the offices of the clerks of the county courts of such
counties.
It is important to observe that while no designation is
made in the statute of parties as formal and informal, the
two classes are expressly recognized and so designated in
the cases just cited. Those named as such in the process
and bill of complaint are formal parties, while those made
such by the publication and posting of the notice required
by statute are designated in the cases as informal parties.
If all judgment creditors are not made parties formally or
informally, and this is disclosed in any manner by the
record, any decree ordering the sale of the lands or a distribution of the proceeds of such sale will be reversed on
appeal. But if all the judgment creditors are made parties
to such suit informally, by being called by publication before a commissioner under a decree of the court to present
their judgments, then a docree ordering a sale of the lands
of the debtor or a distribution of the proceeds of such sale
will not be reversed on appeal, merely because the record
disclosed that some of the judgment creditors had not been
made formal defendants, who ought to have been so made,
unless it appears that objection was made to the rendering
of such decree on this ground in the court below, and before
14 Norris, Caldwell & Co. v. Bean, supra, n. 11; Neely v. Jones, aupra, n.
11; Jackson v. Hull, supra, n. 11; Underwood v. Pack, supra, n. 11.
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such decree was rendered."5 But the rule is otherwise as to
specific lienors, such as vendors holding liens by executory
contract, or by reservation in a deed, attachment liens, and
those holding liens by deed of trust or mortgage, legal or
equitable, or legacies charged by will. They must be made
formal parties, and if not so made. they are not bound by
a convention of lienors by publication and posting of the
statutory notice to lien holders, as are those holding general liens, such as judgment liens. Certain judgment lienors must be made formal parties but not all judgment creditors as already shown; but they being general and not
specific creditors are bound by the decree whether made
formal parties to the bill or not, provided they have by publication in the manner required by statute been made informal parties-a very important distinction in the status
of the two classes of creditors. Any lien creditor, specific
or general, though not properly made a formal or an informal party may present his claim, and if he does so, he
thereby becomes a quasi party, and is bound by the decree."0
A recent decision of the Supreme Court of West Virginia

in a general creditors' suit seems to question by implication,
though it does not overrule, one important ruling in the line
of earlier decisions hereinbefore cited. In the late case of
Dickerson v. Fla~agan,lathe court said:

"Nowhere, how-

ever, does the statute purport to make a lienholder a party
to the suit merely by the publication and posting of the
notice. Since the lienholders are not made parties by the
statute 11* * "

Nothing is said in the opinion about formal

and informal parties or the distinction between them. Two
petitioners came into the case and had their petitions filed,
after the incoming of the commissioner's report, and after
a decree was entered fixing the amounts and priorities of
the liens, and directing sale, in which petitions they set up
judgmients in their favor, and prayed to have them allowed.
The lower court denied the prayer of the petitions, and on
appeal the Supreme Court reversed the lower court, and
held that the petitioners were not barred, for the reason
it Grove v. Judy, supra, n. 11.
16 Benson v. Snyder, 42 W. Va. 223, 226-227, 24 S. E. 880 (1893);
myer v. Sherman, 23 W. Va. 656 (1894).
16a 136 S. E. 854 (W. Va. 1927).
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that the record failed to show that the statutory notice to
lienholders had been "posted" as the statute requires, though
it did show that it had been published. The opinion does
not show whether the petitioners obtained their judgments
in counties other .than those in which the real estate sought
to be subjected lay, nor if so, whether they had recorded
abstracts of their judgments in the latter counties. If they
did obtain their judgments in other counties and failed to
record their abstracts in the county or counties where the
real estate sought to be subjected lay, under the decisions
hereinbefore cited, they should have been made informal
parties by publication and posting of the statutory notice;
-but if they obtained their judgments in the counties where
such real estate lay, or if they obtained them in other counties and recorded abstracts thereof in the counties where
such real estate lay, then they should have been made formal
parties. Though the language above quoted would seem to
indicate that the court recognized no parties except formal
parties, yet it held that the petitioners were not excluded
for the reason that they did not have the notice required by
statute. Such notice being jurisdictional, the statute must
be strictly complied with. This is on principle tantamount
to holding that the petitioners stood upon their rights as
informal parties, and hence the decision is not in conflict
with the decisions of the earlier cases, even though the
language quoted from the opinion, in effect saying that the
only parties are those served with process, clearly conflicts
with the earlier cases holding that certain lienors as hereinbefore shown are made informal parties by publication
and posting of notice as required by statute. The language
quoted being dictum of the court, is not to be taken as modifying or overruling the previous line of decisions holding
that certain judgment lienors are made informal parties to
the suit by publication and posting of the statutory notice.'"
III.

RIGHT OF A DEFENDANT TO CONTEST THE LIEN OF A
C0-DEFENDANT.

When two or more lienors are made parties defendant to
a lien creditors' suit, questions often arise as to the interIT Cases cited, supra, n. 11.
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relations of the defendants, -their rights to contest the validity or priority of the liens of other defendants, the grounds
of such attack and the method of procedure.
Owing to the demand of public policy that there be an end
of litigation as speedily as possible, it has long been the
.policy of courts of equity, where all the parties are before
the court, and their several liabilities are ascertained, to decree in the first instance against the party who is ultimately liable. This doctrine often leads to decrees in favor of
one defendant against another, but that can with propriety
occur only where the equities between the defendants arise
out of the pleadings and proofs between the plaintiffs and
defendants, and substantially the decree is in favor of the
plaintiffs, and it is generally agreed that the courts ought
not to go further than this. 8 There can be no decree between co-defendants where there is no decree in favor of
the plaintiff or plaintiffs.'" The rule was laid down in the
early West Virginia cases and afterwards cited with approval and relied upon by the same court that a decree between co-defendants can be based only upon pleadings and
proofs between the plaintiff or plaintiffs and the defendant or defendants. 0 And where a case is made out between
defendants by evidence arising by pleadings and proofs between the plaintiff and defendants, a court of equity should
render a decree between the co-defendants. 2' Thus it has
been held in a lien creditors' suit that though the decree
admits that a particular debt is a lien upon the estate of the
.udgment debtor and is unsatisfied, the debtor or any other
lienor may dispute the validity of such a lien, and such a
controversy may be decided without violating the above rule.
18 MINI.INST., Pt. II (2nd ed.) p. 1337; 2 BARTON'S CHANCERY PRAC. (2nd
ed.) p. 847, §244.
19 Radcliffe v. Corrothers, 33 W. Va. 682, 11 S. E. 228 (1890); Hansford
v. Chesapeake Coal Co., 22 W. Va. 70 (1883).
20 Vance v. Evans, et al., 11 W. Va. 342 (1877); Ruffner, Donnally &
Co. v. Hewitt, Kerchival & Co., 14 W. Va. 737 (1879); Worthington v.
Staunton, et al., 16 W. Va. 208 (1880); Tavenner v. Barrett, 21 W. Va.
656, 685 (1883); Roots v. Salt Co., 27 W. Va. 483, 488 (1886); McKay v.
McKay, 33 W. Va. 724, 734-5, 11 S. E. 213 (1890); Radcliffe v. Corrothers,
33 W. Va. 682, 11 S. E. 228 (1890) ; Dudley v. Barrett, 66 W. Va. 363, 66
S. E. 507 (1909); Dudley v. Buckley, 68 W. Va. 630, 647, 70 S. E. 376
(1911) ; Pickens' Exors. v. Daniels, 58 W. Va. 327, 52 S. E. 215 (1905).
21 Vance v. Evans, 11 W. Va. 342 (1877) ; Worthington v. Staunton, et al.,
supra, n. 20; Roots v. Salt Co., supra, n. 20.
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The rule is not violated because a defendant disputing the
validity of the lien, admitted by the plaintiff to be valid,
thus raises an issue between himself and the plaintiff, involving such validity, in support of which the contestant
may introduce full proof, and it will be the duty of the
court to decide the question of the validity of the lien so
disputed for or against -the contestant. There may in such
suit be a decree substantially in favor of the plaintiff upholding his lien and right to have the property of the debtor
sold to satisfy his lien and the liens of others, and in the
same decree upon the issue raised between the plaintiff and
the contesting lienor as to the validity of the lien of a codefendant the court may, and in fact should, decree for or
against the contesting lienor.22 But where the equities between the defendants do not arise out of pleadings and
proofs between the plaintiffs and defendants, there can be
no decree between co-defendants.2 3 Matters of difference
between co-defendants constituting a wholly independent
subject of controversy cannot be litigated by answer or cross
bill, and proofs in support thereof, but are proper su'bject
matter for independent litigation. If the rule were not adhered to the administration of justice would become extremely difficult if not impossible in many cases. It could
not be known when, or where or how a chancery cause
would terminate, if all the parties who had any interest in
the subject matter of the bill and who were therefore necessary defendants thereto, could, to save time and expense,
by filing their answers in that cause, or cross bills, litigate
all their differences which were in any way, however remotely, connected with the subject matter of the bill, and in
which the plaintiff had no special interest. The collateral
issues in such cases might be interminable.2 '
In Chapter 125, section 35, Code of West Virginia, 1868,
it is provided that "The defendant in a suit in equity may,
in his answer, allege any new matter constituting a claim
for affirmative relief in such suit, in the same manner and
Tavenner v'. Barrett, 21 W. Va. 656 (1883).
Ruffner, Donnally & Co. v. Hewitt, Kerchival & Co., supra, n. 20;
Worthington v. Staunton, supra, n. 20; Hoffman v. Ryan, 21 W. Va. 415
(1883); Hansford v. Chesapeake Coal Co., 22 NV. Va. 70 (1883); Pickens'
Exors. v. Daniels, supra, n. 20.
24 Worthington ii. Staunton. et al, supra, n. 20.
22
23
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with like effect, as if the same had been alleged in a cross
bill filed by him therein." This language was modified by
Chapter 71, Acts of the Legislature of 188224a by adding
after the words "affirmative relief in such suit" the words
"against the plaintiff or any defendant therein". This
broadened the scope of the section so as to permit a defendant in his answer to allege any new matter constituting
a claim to affirmative relief against the plaintiff or any codefendant. This amendment introduced an important
change in the method of seeking relief by one defendant
against a co-defendant. Prior to this provision relief could
be decreed between co-defendants, in the absence of a crossbill, only when called for by pleadings and proofs between
the plaintiff and defendants, or some of them." The new
matter that may, under the amended act and as the law now
stands, be set up in the answer, was intended to be allowed
in lieu of a cross-bill as to such new matter, and not to
make any other change in the practice as to pleadings in
This statute, when such an answer is
courts of equity."
filed, makes it the basis of a decree between all the parties,
thus treating it as a crosstbill, though it must not introduce matter foreign to the case2 7 It was not intended to
change the character of a cross-bill or enlarge its scope.2 8
An answer can be filed only where a cross-bill could have
been filed." And notwithstanding the change introduced
by the introduction of such amendment, relief may still be
,granted as between co-defendants in the absence of a crossbill, as could be done before the amendment, provided the
bill and answer taken together sufficiently raised the issue
between such defendants. ° But where the bill and answer
do not raise such issue between co-defendants, relief cannot
properly be granted one defendant on an adverse claim
against a co-defendant, except upon an answer plainly stating the grounds therefor, naming such defendant as a party
24a W. VA. CODE, ell.125,
25 Burlew v. Quarrier, 16

§35.
W. Va. 108 (1880);

Root v. Salt Co., supra,

n. 20.
26

Mloore v. Wheeler, 10 W. Va. 35 (1877).

(1896).
Di Bacco v. Benedetto, 92 W. Va. 84, 87, 95 S. E. 601 (1918).
mc'Mullen t'. Eagan, 21 W. Va. 233 (1882).
so Freeman v. Egnor, 72 W. Va. 830, 833, 79 S. E. 824 (1913).
27 Goff v. Price, 42 W. Va. 384, 389, 26 S. E. 287
28
29
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to it, and praying process against him."1 To entitle one to
relief in such answer he must pray for it as he would have
had to do had he filed a regular cross-bill.3 2
As already shown, a lienholder, whether he be made a
formal party or not, may come in under the suit and present his claim and have it allowed, if it is a valid lien on the
debtor's real estate, and from the time he presents such
claim he is deemed a party plaintiff in such suit. Lienors
are sometimes omitted as formal parties, who ought to have
been made such, and all of them may in the manner just
stated come in as informal plaintiffs.
When informal parties come into a suit in the manner
aforesaid and become co-plaintiffs with those made so by
the original process and bill, an interesting question as to
their inter-relations is often presented. Suppose that one
or more of such plaintiffs should wish to contest the validity or priority of the lien of a co-plaintiff. How can this
be done? It is a well established principle of equity procedure that plaintiffs cannot litigate as between themselves
opposing interests or claims. Plaintiffs must have common
interests and stand in the same relation to the subject matter of the litigation. There appears to be only one way out
of the difficulty, and that is for any party plaintiff, whether
formal or informal, wishing to attack the lien of a coplaintiff, upon proper application to the court, to be transposed from plaintiff to defendant, and when so transposed
he is at liberty to attack, in the manner and upon the
grounds elsewhere set forth herein, the lien of any plaintiff or of any co-defendant in the suit.3
There are two important classes of cases in which the
court gives relief to the defendant without a cross-bill or
answer under section 35, chapter 125, Code, but as judgment lien creditors' suits do not fall within either of these
classes, they do not come within the scope of this discussion.3
31

Idem, p. 833.

Middleton v. Selby, 19 W. Va. 167 (1881); McMullen -v. Eagan, supra,
n. 29.
33 See Bilmyer v. Sherman, supra, n. 16, and cases cited.
34 Di Bacco v. Benedetto, supra, n. 28.
32
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IV. ATTACK UPON JUDGMENT FOR FRAUD.
The West Virginia court has held in a number of cases
that a judgment cannot be collaterally assailed except for
want of jurisdiction, and such want of jurisdiction must
appear from the record of the proceedings in which the judgment was rendered." That an attack upon a judgment in
a judgment lien creditors' suit brought to enforce it is collateral and not direct is well settled." Any attack upon a
judgment in a separate suit brought to enforce it is collateral. A direct attack upon a judgment is an attempt
to avoid or correct it in some manner provided by law for
that purpose, in the same proceeding and in the same
court. 7 In a few of the states an attack upon a judgment
by an independent suit has been held to be a direct attack,
but the overwhelming weight of authority is that such attack is collateral. In a West Virginia case, however, the
language used can lead to no other inference than that the
court regarded an attack upon a judgment for debt by an
original bill, or cross-bill or answer, as a direct attack. 8
After stating that a judgment for a debt is conclusive between the parties and as to strangers, of the existence, justness and amount of the debt, and that it can be impeached
by a party or by a stranger only for fraud or collusion, the
court further states: "It can be impeached therefor, not
collaterally, but only by a direct proceeding to set it aside
by original bill or cross-bill or answer." This seems to imply that a proceeding by original -bill, or cross-bill or answer is a direct and not a collateral attack. Lough v.
Taylor, cited, is in conflict with this decision in so far as
the latter holds that a proceeding by cross-bill or answer
to set aside a judgment is a direct proceeding. Lough v.
Taylor holds such attack to be collateral. The reasonable
inference, from the language above quoted is that the court
puts upon the same jurisdictional basis the different methods of attack upon a judgment by cross-bill, answer and
ar, Lough v. Taylor, 97 W. Va. 180, 124 S. E. 585 (1924); Lemley v.
Coal & Coke Co., 82 W. Va. 153, 155-6, 95 S. E. 646 (1918), citing cases.
oe Lough v. Taylor, supra.
87 34 C. J. 520.
32 Turner v. Stewart, 51 W. Va. 493, 41 S. E. 924 (1902).
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original bill. 9 If the matter were properly presented to the
court it would probably hold that a creditor has a right to
attack a judgmet for fraud in the procurement thereof, by
independent suit if no suit has been brought to enforce it,
such as a judgment lien creditors' suit, or, if such suit has
been brought, then that such attack may be made by answer
or cross-bill. In an earlier as well as in later cases the
same court upheld the right of the defendant in a judgment lien creditors' suit to make defense against the judgment provided he showed some reason founded on fraud,
accident, surprise, or some adventitious circumstance beyond his control, why the defense at law was not made.4"
Numerous cases in West Virginia hold that a judgment of
a court of law may be assailed collaterally for fraud.' 1 In
one case 42 the court held that in a judgment lien creditors'
suit the judgment as between the judgment creditor and
other judgment creditors is conclusive of the justness and
amount of the debt, and that such judgment, valid on its
face, cannot be impeached by such other creditor except for
fraud, and that that cannot be done otherwise than in a
direct proceeding to set it aside on that ground. What does
the court mean by a direct proceeding? In the body of the
opinion, it is said that a judgment cannot, on a bill to enforce a lien against real estate, be impeached, except for
The language of the syllabus and of
fraud or collusion.
the opinion cannot be reconciled except upon the theory
that the court regarded an attack by one lienor against the
lien of another lienor in a judgment creditors' suit as a
direct attack. It is probable, however, that the court did
not use the term "direct proceeding" in its strict technical
sense, and that a lienor in such suit could attack the lien
of another lienor by proper answer or cross-bill directly
charging fraud and collusion.
The better reasoned cases in other jurisdictions as well as
39 See Clark v. Figgins, 31 IV. Va. 156, 5 S. E. 643

(1888).
McNeel's Exors. v. Auldridge, supra, n. 11.
4 S upra; Wlyatt v. Wyatt, 79 W. Va. 708, 711, 92 S. E. 117 (1917);
Kelley 'v. Thompson, 87 W. Va. 694, 697-8, 106 S. E. 230 (1921); Stewart
v. Senter, 88 W. Va. 124, 129, 130, 106 S. E. 443 (1921); Parsons v. Parsons, 102 W. Va. 394, 135 S. E. 228 (1926).
42 Bank v,. Distilling Co., 41 W. Va. 530, 23 S. E. 792 (1895).
43 SUpra.
40
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in West Virginia hold that the fraud that will vitiate a judgment and warrant a court of equity in giving relief against
it in a suit to enforce the lien of a judgment against real
estate of the judgment debtor is fraud in the procurement
thereof, and not such fraud as might have been availed of
by proper defense in the law court where the judgment was
taken." 'Some of the cases cited in support of the proposition that equity will relieve against fraud in the procurement of a judgment are cases of judgment ,taken by default,
and where for good cause shown such judgment may be set
aside under section 47, chapter 135, Code. In other cases
cited judgment was had after appearance and defense, so
that the right to attack a judgment for fraud is not confined
to cases of judgment by default.
The West Virginia court in common with the courts of
last resort of other states, most entitled to respect, struggles to give verity, certainty and finality to judgments and
decrees. ,Justice as well as public policy requires that this
be done, and hence the principle is accepted generally that
judgments should not be overturned except for grave reasons, and then only as a rule in a direct proceeding, rather
than by collateral attack. But justice also requires that
litigants should not under the forms of law be defrauded
by their rights, or otherwise be caused to suffer loss or
damage by the wrongs of others when not themselves at
fault, provided relief can be given through the remedial
processes of equity, without upturning or improperly invading sound principles of equity or of equitable procedure.
The general policy of the West Virginia court has been to
uphold the sancity of judgments on the one hand, as above
stated, and to grant relief to those whose rights have been
unduly invaded through the forms of law on the other,
with the result that we have a line of decisions holding that
a judgment cannot be collaterally assailed except for want
of jurisdiction, and even then only when such want of jurisdiction appears from an inspection of the record, and another line holding to the contrary, namely, that a judgment
may be collaterally assailed not only for want of jurisdiction but for fraud or collusion in the procurement of the
44

Parsons v. Parsons, supra, n. 41; Stewart v. Seater, supra, n. 41.
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judgment, though such fraud or collusion may not appear
from inspection of the record, and upon other grounds.
It is impossible to speak with confidence as to the rights
of lienors in a lien creditors' suit to assail judgment liens
of other co-defendants or of plaintiffs. From the confused
state of the law, however, it may reasonably be deduced that
a judgment lienor or other lienor, made a party to a judgment lien creditors' suit, may, by cross-bill or answer under section 35, chapter 125, Code, assail a judgment lien
set up as prior to his own upon the ground of want of jurisdiction in the court where same was rendered, provided such
want of jurisdiction is apparent from an inspection of the
record. Such a judgment may always be assailed collaterally wherever it is sought to assert it, not only in West Virginia but in any other jurisdiction where a sound system of
legal procedure prevails. An original bill will lie to vacate
a judgment taken by default where the defendant has no
notice of the pendency of the action, even though service of
process may appear by the return of the officer to have been
regularly and properly made. Such return is only prima
facie evidence of service and may be overthrown by proof
of lack of notice.4 5 If an original bill will lie to vacate such
judgment, may it not upon the same grounds be vacated
by proceeding by way of answer or cross-bill in a lien creditors' suit? Notwithstanding the late case of Lough v.
Taylor holding that a judgment in a lien creditors' suit
brought to enforce it may be assailed collaterally only for
want of jurisdiction in the court where it was rendered, it is
probable that a judgment may be assailed in a lien creditors'
suit collaterally for fraud and collusion in .the procurement
thereof, such right being upheld, as we have seen, in different West Virginia decisions never expressly overruled.
There are other grounds of attack by a defendant upon
the lien of a co-defendant or of a plaintiff but we have not
space to consider them here.
45

Fuel Co. v. National Bank, 89 W. Va. 438, 109 S. E. 760
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V.
SALE OF PART OF REAL ESTATE INVOLVED BEFORE
AMOUNTS AND PRIORITIES OF LIENS ARE DETERMINED.

The question sometimes arises whether the court can direct the sale of any of the real estate involved in a lien creditors' suit before it has ascertained the amounts and priorities of all the liens thereon, either by reference of the cause
to a commissioner for that purpose or by the court without
such reference; and before it is in like manner determined
whether the rents, issues and profits from the real estate
will be sufficient in five years to discharge the liens thereon.
A trust creditor may for example appear by the bill to have
a first lien on a given parcel of real estate followed by many
other liens with the amounts and priorities disclosed by the
bill. If such first trust lienor files his petition setting up
his lien as first in order of priority and sets out the other
trusts and other liens in harmony with the allegations of
the bill, alleging that his trust lien exceeds the full value
of such real estate, so that there will be no equities available for the satisfaction of any other liens thereon, has the
court a right upon such showing, and without a formal ascertainment of the amounts and priorities of all the liens
thereon, and without giving the judgment or other lienors
an opportunity to contest the amounts or priorities of the
alleged first trust lien, to appoint a trustee in such deed of
trust or any one else a special commissioner with direction
to sell the real estate covered by such trust and distribute
the proceeds of the sale in satisfaction of such trust lien
before the adjudication of the liens and the sale of the remainder of the estate involved in the suit? It is conceded
that some hardship may be wrought upon such first trust
lienor, or upon other lienors by compelling them to await
the final outcome of the whole litigation before they can
realize upon their claims, and it is contended by some, and
held by some of the trial courts that it is on the whole inequitable under conditions that sometimes arise for the
court to refuse to sell the real estate so covered by a first
trust lien in advance of the sale of the remainder thereof,
and after all the liens have been formally adjudicated.
It is well settled in West Virginia that when a suit is
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brought by a judgment creditor to enforce his lien on land,
and those of other lienors, and a creditor and trustee in a
deed of trust are made formal parties, a sale cannot be made
under the deed of trust pending the suit. Such creditor
must await the action of the court, and he cannot by independent proceedings outside of court defeat such action.4"
But such lien, like any other lien, must be enforced in that
proceeding. And notwithstanding his lien may be prior to
all others, such trust deed creditor and his trustee may be
enjoined from making sale under the deed of trust; and it is
not error to refuse to dissolve the injunction and decree a
sale of the trust property until it is judicially determined
that such trust lien has priority."7 But the question still
remains unanswered whether the court under any circumstances may decree a sale of a portion of the property involved in a suit before there is a finding of its own, based
upon the pleadings and facts disclosed, or by reference to a
commissioner, of the amounts and priorities of all the liens
upon the whole of the real estate of the debtor. The question appears to be well settled in the negative in both the
Virginias so far as it is possible to settle any proposition by
a long and consistent line of decisions, though recently an
application was presented to the West Virginia court, or to
a judge thereof, for an appeal from a decree ordering the
sale of valuable property in a lien creditors' suit before the
case was referred to a commissioner or the liens determined
and their priorities fixed, and the appeal was denied and
the sale made in advance of the adjudication of the other
liens. There is a long line of decisions in both the Virginias holding such action by a trial court reversible error.4 8 In West Virginia the court has been consistent
throughout in upholding the same principle, beginning at
an early date and continuing practically down to the pres48 Stafford v. Jones, 65 W. Va. 567, 64 S. E. 723 (1909) ; Parsons v.
Snider, 42 W. Va. 517, 26 S. E. 285 (1896); Abney-Barnes Co. v. Coal Co.,
83 W. Va. 292, 302, 98 S. E. 298 (1919).
47 Stafford v. Jones, supra.
48 See cases cited at 8 Virginia-West Virginia Digest (old series) 674,
too numerous for citation here.
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ent time.49 After the institution of a judgment creditors'
suit and before a decree ascertaining the amounts and priorities of the liens, it is error to decree a sale by a trustee
under a deed of trust, although such deed of trust may constitute a first lien upon the property."
The reason for the
rule is that to decree such sale before ascertaining the
amounts of the several liens and their respective priorities
has a tendency to sacrifice the property, by discouraging
creditors from bidding as they probably would do, if their
right to the satisfaction of their debts, and the order in
which they were to be paid out of the property, had been
previously determined."' The debtor himself is also vitally
interested in having the property bring the best price obtainable, and therefore he has a right to have any uncertainty respecting the liens determined before a sale is
made.2
While all of the foregoing decisions do not in terms hold
that no part of the debtor's real estate can be sold before
there is a judicial determination of all the liens upon all the
real estate involved in the suit, such rule is logically implied
in all of them and generally expressly upheld. If a part of
the real estate can be sold before a judicial determination
of the amounts and priorities of all the liens, the purpose
Iof such requirement as above laid down would be defeated
in that neither the debtor would be in a position to realize
the most possible for his property nor would the creditors
desiring to bid have the requisite information to enable
them to protect their interests at the bidding, with the result that there would be a tendency to sacrifice the property.
49 Livesay, Exors. v. Jarrett, 3 W. Va. 283 (1869); Anderson v. Nagle,
et al., 12 W. Va. 98 (1877); MIarling v. Robrecht, 13 WV.Va. 440 (1878);
Scott v. Ludington, 14 W. Va. 387 (1878) ; 'cClaskey v. O'Brien, 16 W. Va.
791, 844 (1879); Beaty v. Veon, 18 W. Va. 291, 293 (1881); Payne V.
Webb, 23 W. Va. 558 (1854); Keck v. Allender, 37 W. Va. 201, 16 S. E.
520 (1892); Sandusky v. Faris, 49 W. Va. 150, 172, 38 S. E. 563 (1901);
Childers v. Loudin, 51 W. Va. 559, 565, 42 S. E. 637 (1902); Stafford v.
Jones, supra, n. 46; Carter v. Carter, 83 W. Va. 312, 98 S. E. 296 (1919);
Sulzberger v. Fairmont Packing Co., 86 W. Va. 361, 103 S. E. 121 (1920);
Blumberg Bros. Co. v. King, 98 W. Va. 275, 127 S. E. 47 (1925).
50 Sulzberger v. Fairmont Packing Co., sutpra, citing cases.
al. Marling v. Robrecht, supra, n. 49.
B2 Carter v. Carter, supra, n. 49; Payne v. Webb, 23 W. Va. 558 (1884).
a8 Abney-Barnes Co. v. Coal Co., supra, n. 46; CoDE, ch. 139, §7; Westinghouse v. Ingram, 79 V. Va. 220, 90 S. E. 837 (1916); Dunfee v. Childs, 45
W. Va. 155, 164 (1898).
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It is generally necessary before decreeing sale for the
court to ascertain by reference to a commissioner or by an
express finding of its own based upon the pleadings and
facts disclosed whether the rents and profits will be sufficient to discharge the lien indebtedness within five years."
But if the bill alleges, and the respondents do not deny that
the rents and profits to accrue from the property will not
in five years discharge the liens, an inquiry need not be
made."
VI.

iCOSTS IN LIEN

CREDITORS'

SUITS.

Costs in litigation intcr parties were unknown at common
law. They are the creation of statute, beginning with the
Statute of Gloucester, followed by several other ancient
statutes, resulting in the imposition of costs as a penalty
upon the unsuccessful party to litigation. In West Virginia if is provided by statute that the laws of costs shall
not be interpreted as penal."
And it is likewise provided
that the party for whom final judgment is given in any action, or in a motion for judgment for money, whether plaintiff or defendant, shall recover his costs against the opposite party. 8 But it is also provided that nothing contained in that chapter shall take away or abridge the discretion of a court of equity over costs except that in every
case in an appellate court costs shall be recovered by the
party substantially prevailing. 7 This statute recognizes as
inherent the power of a court of equity to award costs.
That power, however, is not an arbitrary one, but must be
exercised agreeably to a sound discretion, and where its
power has not been clearly abused or exceeded it will not
be disturbed on appeal5 8
The allowance of costs and expenses in lien creditors'
suits rests upon a wholly different basis from the ancient
idea of punishment. It rests upon the idea that he who re54 Abney-Barnes Co. v. Coal Co., supra, n. 46; Neewlon v. Wade, 43 W. Va.
283, 287, 27 S. E. 244 (1897); Muse v. Friedenwald, 77 Va. 57 (1883);
Ewart v. Saunders, 25 Gratt. 203 (1874); Horton v. Bond, 28 Gratt. 815
(1877) ; Barr v. White, 30 Gratt. 531 (1878).
55 W. VA. CODE, Ch. 138, §10.
5e Idem, §8.
57 Idem, §§10 and 11.
58 Hannah v. Lumber Co., 92 W. Va. 104, 11 S. E. 506 (1922).
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ceives a benefit in such litigation should bear his part of
the attendant expenses. So it has been held that where an
estate had no money, and certain creditors advanced the
necessary funds with which to prosecute the suit in behalf
of the estate, only those who had thus contributed should
share in the property recovered by the suit.5"
In such cases the costs are paid out of the proceeds of the
sale of the real estate involved as a first charge against the
same, and those advancing costs, whether plaintiffs or defendants, will be entitled to reimbursement out of the proceeds of the sale for the amount so advanced. If the proceeds are insufficient to defray the costs of the litigation
and the liens, the costs will be paid first, and the remainder
of the proceeds applied towards the discharge of the liens in
the order of their priority, or pro rata upon liens of equal
dignity. In this manner the fund to be administered is resorted to for payment of the costs of its own administration
where it is sufficient to pay both the liens and the costs of
the litigation, and it is likewise resorted to where it is insufficient to pay both the liens and the costs, first for the
payment of costs and then for the payment of the remainder
upon the liens, in such manner as to assess against each
lienor in effect his proportionate share of the costs of the
suit which the proceeds of the sale of the real estate involved were not sufficient to defray.
b9 Cornell v. Nicholls Co., 201 Fed 320 (1912).
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